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Abstract
There are important differences among former communist countries in performance of their 
agricultural sectors that are commonly attributed to variation in inherent institutions and reform 
policy choices. In this paper the link between institutions, reforms and (labour) productivity growth 
in agriculture is analysed within an augmented neo-classical growth model framework derived from 
a production function. For the empirical analysis panel data over the transition period (1990–2001) 
were used that cover 15 former communist countries, applying a GMM-IV estimator. Estimation results 
strongly support the view that the shift to individual land use, measuring farm restructuring, as well as 
the overall economic reforms, supported by democratic institutions, have positively contributed to the 
(labour) productivity growth in former communist countries’ agriculture.  
Additional keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, individual farming, transition
Introduction
This paper examines the factors behind the differences among 15 former communist 
countries in performance of their agricultural sectors.1 Various studies have shown 
that the distortions imposed in the past by the planned economy, with respect to type 
of prevailing institutions, ownership, and management of land have weighed heavily 
during the first decade of transition [see Rozelle & Swinnen (2004) for an overview 
of relevant studies]. Policies to eliminate these distortions have been implemented at 
a varying pace, often because of opposition by vested interests and groups fearing the 
loss of employment and access to subsidized resources. This has resulted in substantial 
differences among countries in output and productivity growth.
 The progress in agricultural reform has been strongly associated with progress 
in general economic reform (Anon., 2002). Such progress has in turn been closely 
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associated with more democratic and competitive political systems and institutions. As 
a result, the more successful agricultural reformers have been the Central European 
countries (CEC). By contrast, in many of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) major institutional and policy hurdles to improving the performance of the sector 
have long remained. There is evidence suggesting that improving the performance of 
the agricultural sector requires adoption of policies that can boost productivity through 
restructuring and investment (Lerman et al., 2004). But for that to happen, greater clarity 
concerning title to land and the facilitation of a better functioning land and inputs market 
are required. The reforms most relevant to agriculture have included price and trade 
liberalization, land reform, farm restructuring and individualization of agricultural land 
use, privatization of input supply and agro-processing, and changes in rural finance. 
 Table 1 summarizes indicators of progress in reforms among 15 former communist 
countries. It is evident that progress has varied widely but that a number of patterns 
emerge. Progress in general economic reform and progress in agricultural reform are 
highly correlated. Consequently, the more advanced reformers are mostly found among 
the CEC and the Baltic States. In the CIS, general economic reform, including price 
liberalization has proceeded more slowly. The differences in implementation across the 
range of reforms have been characteristic of the intermediate and late reformers. For 
example, in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine implementation of land reform 
and institutional change has lagged behind.
 Table 1 also shows that there have been major differences among the 15 countries 
in the methods by which land has changed ownership. Restitution of farmland to 
former owners has been the most common land reform process in the CEC, Balkans, 
and Baltic States except for Poland, Albania and Slovenia.2 Typically, in most countries 
the reform laws have specified that land had to be restituted to former owners, using 
historical boundaries, if possible. If not, former owners have been entitled to a plot 
of land of comparable size and quality. Most CIS countries, including Russia and 
Ukraine, have distributed collective and state farmland equally among collective 
farm members or state farm employees in the form of paper shares or certificates.3
In Belarus and Kazakhstan, however, only private ownership of household plots has 
been permitted. Physical distribution of farmland to farm workers or rural households 
on an equal per capita basis occurred in Albania and partly in Hungary and Romania 
(Lerman et al., 2004). This variation in the features of land reform can be largely 
attributed to initial conditions and institutional specificities, such as the length of time 
since the land was nationalized and the ethnicity and equality of land ownership before 
collectivization. 
 The tradability of land or ability to transfer land has also varied substantially. In 
the countries with advanced land reform, rights to buy and sell, as well as leasing, have 
been universally implemented. Nevertheless, there remains – even within this group 
– significant variation in the share of land held by individuals. The break-up of collective 
farms into individual farms has taken place in very different ways and resulted in a 
diverse picture within groups of countries that are otherwise homogeneous with respect 
to success in the transition process. In Albania, for example, there was a complete 
break-up of the collective farms, whereas in Kazakhstan and Slovakia the share of land 
used by individual farms remained small. At present, the former communist countries 
Institutions, reform policies and productivity growth in agriculture: evidence from former communist countries 
commonly have a mix of farm organizations, such as private co-operative farms, joint-
stock companies, family farms and part-time farmers (e.g., Rizov, 2005a). 
 Despite the diverse outcomes there has been a relatively uniform strategy of 
agricultural transition aimed to improve efficiency and productivity by replacing the 
institutional and organizational features of the command economy with attributes 
borrowed from the practice of market economies (Lerman, 1999). The ideal transition 
agenda formulated in the early 1990s – mostly on economic grounds – envisaged a 
shift from collective to more efficient individualized land use as the ultimate goal. 
Individual land use was expected to allow farmers, once established as independent 
entities, to engage in land-market transactions and optimize the size of the holdings 
given their managerial skills and availability of resources (e.g., Deininger, 1995; 
Lerman, 1998; Rizov, 2003). This process was expected to increase efficiency and 
productivity, and ultimately result in growth of incomes. Thus one could hypothesize 
– given necessary economic reform being implemented – that individualization of land 
use would positively influence agricultural productivity because of the higher efficiency 
of the individual family farm organization. Besides, individualization could also have 
an indirect effect on agricultural productivity growth, resulting from the more efficient 
reallocation of resources among farm organizations.  
 In this paper this hypothesis is empirically tested within a neo-classical growth 
model framework following Rizov (2005b). This approach avoids criticisms on the 
grounds of lack of theoretical and objective criteria for including various explanatory 
variables and controls for unobserved country-specific effects and endogeneity of the 
reform variables.4 The present analysis is an extension of Rizov (2005b), explicitly 
discussing the links between inherent institutions and reform policy choices. 
Furthermore, additional policy variables are used in the econometric analysis. The 
estimation results are robust to various timing assumptions and support the view that 
the shift to individual land use has positively contributed to the (labour) productivity 
growth in the agricultural sectors of former communist countries. It is also concluded 
that the effect of initial conditions and institutions manifests through the impacts 
of individualized land use and general economic reforms. So the effect of inherent 
institutions on agricultural (labour) productivity growth is only indirect.
Institutions and agricultural reform policies
In this chapter the relationships between inherent institutions and the evolution of 
agricultural reform policies is investigated.5 It has been argued by several authors 
(e.g., Lerman et al., 2004; Rizov, 2005b) that individualization of agricultural 
production has had significant impact on productivity growth. Clearly, at the heart
of agricultural reform and farm restructuring is the issue of land ownership and 
land use. The critical policy decision has been whether to pursue restitution of land 
to previous owners, or distribution to collective farm workers. This policy choice 
has in part been driven by institutional factors such as the history of private land 
ownership, concentration of ownership prior to collectivization, and the number of 
years under communism. Private land ownership was a well-established institution in 
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the CEC and Balkans, and legal ownership rights remained in force even during the 
Communist period. For these countries the question was not whether to restitute land 
to legal owners, but how, since the political cost of not restituting land and property 
was higher than the cost involved in breaking up the co-operative farms (Swinnen, 
1999). In countries where land ownership before collectivization was highly unequal, 
the choice involved was deciding what value should be attached to considerations of 
historical justice as against current equity. Moreover, privatization – either through 
straight restitution, distribution, or a combination of the two – could be managed in 
such a way to rebalance land holdings among different social groups, i.e., foreigners 
as against nationals or members of a dominant ethnic group as against a minority. 
Finally, in countries where over several generations communist attitudes towards the 
land had taken firmer root, the demand for private land ownership was weaker, and 
this contributed to the choice of share distribution or limited use rights rather than 
distribution of land plots.
 Here we argue that the choices of reform policies were predetermined by 
inherent institutions. Consequently, the choices about the way in which the land 
reform was to be implemented in the early stages of transition have generated their 
own dynamics. Privatization through land share issues – as in Kazakhstan, Russia, 
and Ukraine – has tended to strengthen vested interest groups opposed to further 
land reform. Uncertainties over title and the high transaction costs associated with 
starting independent farms have reduced incentives for rural entrepreneurs to leave 
the incompletely privatized collective farms. In the absence of enforceable ownership 
rights and a law on mortgages, credit has been largely unavailable to independent 
farmers, which in turn has fed a preference for maintaining under-priced access to 
the inputs, technology and social services provided by the collective farm system. As 
a result, farm restructuring and individualization of land use have developed slowly 
in countries that issued land shares. For example, in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, 
countries that pursued allocation by land (paper) shares, the proportion of land in 
individual farms has been less than 20%. In Albania and Romania, which pursued 
allocation of land by physical plots, the share of land in individual farms between 1989 
and 2000 increased to almost 90% (Table 1).
 Resistance to reform can be traced to a variety of factors. In the CIS countries, for 
example, there is evidence that some regional authorities not only resisted reforms 
because this would have reduced the level of subsidy to the sector, they also resisted 
the restructuring of former collectives as they comprised a significant part of their 
regional power base. As such, regional authorities used the redistribution of subsidies 
and the provision of soft budget constraints at collective farms to shore up support, 
whereas agricultural producers preferred the status quo for fear of jeopardizing their 
access to subsidies.6 Indeed, defensive motives on the part of incumbents have been 
an important part of the story. With few outside opportunities and uncertainty about 
future access to land and associated inputs, collective-farm workers and managers have 
generally remained passive. 
 Although such obstacles to agricultural reform have proven formidable in some 
countries, they have not been insurmountable. The consequent progress in reform in 
Bulgaria, Romania, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine illustrates how shifts in governing 
Institutions, reform policies and productivity growth in agriculture: evidence from former communist countries 
coalitions to more reform-oriented parties, fiscal crises, as well as external pressure, 
can affect policy. Thus, an acute financial and fiscal crisis in Bulgaria in 1996 led to 
loss of power by the successor communist party and to the advent of a new government 
that was able to implement wide-ranging agricultural reforms. In 1998, faced with 
mounting problems in the farming sector, Kazakhstan saw a significant policy shift 
in farm restructuring. A combination of repeated write-offs of public sector debts, 
the widespread use of barter and a severe drought had brought Kazakhstan’s farming 
sector to the brink of collapse. The government launched a new programme of farm 
restructuring based on recognition of the need for extensive application of bankruptcy 
law. In Russia, the combination of strong presidential leadership and a shift in the 
balance of power in the Russian State Duma has overcome political opposition to the 
2002 Land Law. This new legislation significantly strengthened the right to ownership 
of agricultural land and paved the way for the emergence of a land market. Romania 
has also made dramatic progress in agricultural reform since 1998, particularly in 
improving the public institutions that support the agricultural sector and in privatizing 
state-owned agro-processing companies. These reforms have, in part, been set in 
motion by the need to fulfil requirements set out in the EU’s acquis communautaire
in order to qualify for second-round accession. This external factor has also been 
important for some of the advanced reformers in Central and Eastern Europe who have 
managed to press through reforms despite the persistence of a conservative rural base.  
 Comparative politics studies of the former communist countries demonstrate a 
positive correlation between democratic systems of governance reflecting the presence of 
progressive institutions, and overall economic reform involving stabilization, structural 
and institutional reform (De Soto, 2000; Olson, 2000). This can be attributed to the fact 
that a greater degree of political openness and a larger number of checks on government 
power by representative civil society organizations characterize stable democratic 
systems. Apart from the conduct of regular elections and political competition, stable 
democracies also tend to promote the rule of law, free speech and other civil and political 
rights. This makes them more likely to be resistant to capture by special (individual or 
group) interests that seek to maximize their private benefits. Empirical research suggests 
that stable democracies are also better at protecting private property rights and enforcing 
contracts, without which farmers face reduced incentives to invest in their land and 
improve agricultural productivity (Conning & Robinson, 2001).
 Analysis of Spearman correlations between our reform indicators in Table 1 and 
indicators of democratic institutions confirm the pattern discussed above. There 
is a strong positive correlation between the degree of reform success in both the 
agricultural sector and the overall economy and the five-year (1997–2001) average 
measure of democracy taken from the Freedom House database.7 Conversely, 
the worst performing transition countries have been those with low measures of 
democracy. However, it is also important to note (Table 1) that measures of overall 
reform – such as the EBRD indicators – are strongly correlated with measures of 
reform in agriculture. As such, there is a clear positive association between democratic 
institutions and reform in general. The relationships are confirmed by an analysis 
of the correlations, using the Freedom House five-year average political governance 
indicator. It was found that broad-based multi-party coalitions have generally been the 
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more successful ones in implementing and sustaining reform in both the agricultural 
sector and the overall economy. Interestingly, as asserted by Mainwaring & Shugart 
(1997), this goes against much of the conventional wisdom in the literature, holding 
that successful reform has normally been associated with strong executives insulated 
from the constraints of political competition and from the compromises that are often 
required to sustain coalition governments.8
Methodology and data
The link between institutions, reforms and (labour) productivity in agriculture was 
econometrically investigated, focusing on the experiences of the 15 former communist 
countries listed in Table 1. The main data sources were the national statistics offices, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), and the World Bank. Comparable agricultural sector annual data 
were available over the period 1990–2001. However, no data were available for each 
year for all countries, making the panel unbalanced. Clearly, availability of comparable 
data limits the set of countries and variables used in our econometric analysis, even 
though we used the best aggregate agricultural sector data available.  
 The productivity growth in agriculture was measured in terms of growth of the 
gross agricultural output per worker, GAOw. According to Solow’s neo-classical model 
it is more appropriate to use per worker than per capita variables, because the model 
is based on a production function and not every person from the country’s population 
contributes to production (Solow, 1956). Contrary to previous empirical studies that 
focused on average changes in the early years of transition (e.g., Lerman, 2000; Macours 
& Swinnen, 2000a, b), we considered year-to-year changes in GAOw. By calculating the 
growth rates in agricultural production per worker for each country at a given point in 
time it was possible to demonstrate the high heterogeneity among countries (Table 1).
 In the Solow model, growth in output per worker depends on the actual output per 
worker, q(t), the initial output per worker, q(0) , the initial level of technology, A(0) , the 
rate of technological progress, a , the savings/investment rate, s , the growth rate of the 
labour force, l , the depreciation rate, d , the share of capital in output, k , and the rate 
of convergence to steady state, C , according to the following equation: 
  lnq(t) – lnq(0) = – (1 – e–Ct ) lnq(0) + (1 – e–Ct ) lnA(0) + at  (1)
   k   k
  + (1 – e–Ct )  —  ln(s) – (1 – e–Ct )  —  ln(l + a + d).
  1 – k  1 – k
 The model predicts that a high savings/investment rate will affect growth positively, 
whereas a high labour force growth corrected for the rate of technological progress and 
the rate of depreciation will have a negative effect on growth.
 GAOw was measured in Purchasing Power Parity adjusted US dollars and was 
calculated by using the 1990 level of agricultural Gross Domestic Product obtained 
Institutions, reform policies and productivity growth in agriculture: evidence from former communist countries 
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from the EBRD database and the FAO annual output index over the period 1990–2001. 
Due to the lack of any better measure, the savings–investment rate, s , was calculated 
as the ratio of output and input agriculture-specific prices. This ratio is a good proxy 
for the gross margin that is closely related to the availability of internal funds. Under 
conditions of imperfect financial markets and credit constraints the sensitivity of 
investment to internal financing has been shown to be high (see e.g., Fazzari et al., 
1988). The annual data for agricultural labour force are from the countries’ national 
statistics offices and the International Labour Organization (ILO), the latter being a 
more reliable source of agricultural employment data than FAO. The average labour 
force growth rate, l , was computed as the difference between the natural logarithms 
of agricultural labour force at the end and beginning of each year. Like in the literature 
(e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992; Islam, 1995; Caselli et al., 1996), the sum of the natural 
logarithm of labour force growth rate and 0.05 (for constant technological progress and 
depreciation rate) was calculated as a proxy for ln(l + a + d). 
 The model was augmented with control variables that represent measures of general 
economic and agricultural reforms as well as the measure of individualization.9 Progress 
in general economic reforms, REFORM, was measured as the average of a set of EBRD 
indicators including measures for price and trade liberalization, privatization, and 
enterprise restructuring, which capture the extensiveness of economic reforms in several 
dimensions.10 The measures of agricultural reform, AGREFORM, were derived from 
the World Bank ECA indicators and from own calculations following the World Bank 
methodology and using data from national statistics offices. Five components make up 
the World Bank ECA index: (1) price and market liberalization, (2) land reform, (3) agro-
processing industry restructuring, (4) rural finance development, and (5) institutional 
reform. The extent of farm restructuring was measured as the share of total agricultural 
land that is used by individual farms, INDIVID (ITAL in Table 1). Data from the 
countries’ national statistics offices and Macours & Swinnen (2000a) were used. The 
values of all measures of reform-progress and farm restructuring were expressed in 
natural logarithms. 
 Possible estimation techniques for the model specified in Equation (1) are cross-
section regressions using data averaged over long periods (e.g., Barro, 1991; Mankiw 
et al., 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1997) or a dynamic panel data approach (e.g., Islam, 
1995; Caselli et al., 1996). Single cross-section growth regressions have several 
disadvantages: (1) the time series are reduced to a single mean and not all available 
information is used, (2) it is very likely that single cross-section regressions suffer 
from omitted variable bias, and (3) one or more of the regressors may be endogenous. 
Within a dynamic panel data framework (e.g., Hansen, 1982; Arellano & Bond, 1991) it 
is possible to account for unobserved country-specific effects and allow for endogeneity 
of the regressors.11 The panel data model takes the following form:
  git = α + βqit–1 + γxit + vi + εit     (2)
where git denotes the growth rate of GAOw for country i (i = 1,...,I) at time t (t = 2,...,T), 
qit–1 is the logarithm of the level of GAOw at the beginning of each period, and xit is 
a vector of regressors such as investment rate and employment growth, following the 
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Solow model. Furthermore, as in most empirical studies that are based on more general 
models a range of measures of reform was included. The time-invariant unobserved 
country-specific effects and the random error term are denoted vit and εit, respectively.  
 Using Equation (2) the dynamic panel data model was rewritten as:
  qit – qit-1 = α + βqit–1 + γxit + vi + εit
which then becomes
  qit  = α + β*qit–1 + γxit + vi + εit    (3)
where β* = (β + 1).  
 In estimating Equation (3) the issue of how to treat time-invariant country-specific 
characteristics such as initial conditions, inherent institutions, and type of land reform 
adopted, was explicitly addressed. If measured time-invariant country characteristics, wi ,
are included in the analysis, Equation (3) becomes: 
  qit  = α + β*qit−1 + γxit + δwi +  vi + εit
However, the measured country-specific characteristics, wi , may be correlated with 
the unobserved country-specific effects, vi , or the error term, εit. In order to address 
inconsistency problems due to (1) omitted unobserved time-invariant country effects 
(Hsiao, 1986), (2) small number of time periods, T (Nickell, 1981), or (3) correlations 
between regressors and vi and/or εit the first-difference GMM-IV estimator was 
applied. Thus, Equation (3) was estimated without including the measured country-
specific characteristics, wi , i.e., vi* = δwi + vi was substituted for vi.12
 In the first-difference equation, under standard assumptions, the instrument set 
consists of lags of the dependent variable as well as right-hand-side regressors. Values 
of qit lagged two periods or more are valid instruments because qit–2 and earlier values 
are generally correlated with Δqit–1 but not with Δεit. If the regressors, xit , are strictly 
exogenous (E[xitεip] = 0 for all p, t) then all past, present and future values of xit are 
valid instruments in the first-difference equation, even if the xit are correlated with vi. 
However, it is likely that some of the regressors in our model, e.g., policies or policy 
outcomes (capital and labour reallocation rates as well as shares of individual farming), 
were not strictly exogenous. There may be a feedback mechanism where past shocks 
to productivity are correlated with current policies or outcomes. Following Arellano & 
Bond (1991) we then used values of the predetermined xit lagged one period or more 
as valid instruments in the first-difference equation. If a regressor is endogenous we 
have to allow for correlation between the current value of this regressor and current 
shocks to productivity, as well as for feedback from past shocks to productivity. In that 
case, valid instruments in the first-difference equation are values of the endogenous xit
lagged two periods or more. 
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Estimation results
The results of GMM-IV estimations based on the neoclassical growth model have been 
summarized in Table 2. The estimated equations are log-linear so that the estimated 
coefficients of all explanatory variables can be interpreted as elasticities. The left-hand-
side variable is the change in the logarithm of gross agricultural output per worker 
(GAOw). All regressions included time dummies (not shown, just like the constant), 
which in all regressions were found to be jointly significant. There was no second-
order serial correlation (the m2-test) and the Sargan test did not reject the validity of 
instruments in all specifications. 
 First, a regression corresponding to the textbook Solow model was run [Table 2, 
column (1)]. All variables are statistically significant (P < 0.01) and have the expected 
signs. The negative regression coefficient on initial GAOw – as in most published 
work – is interpreted as conditional convergence, where investment has a positive 
and growth of labour force a negative impact as suggested by the Solow model.13 The 
implied rate of convergence to steady state (C) was about 7% per annum, which is quite 
high but not surprising for the case of economic transition. It appears that the most 
important determinant of growth in agricultural (labour) productivity is the reduction 
in excess labour, which is interpreted as an indicator of passive restructuring whereas 
active restructuring is defined as new investment (Coricelli & Djankov, 2001). 
 Next, regressions augmented with measures of progress in agricultural and general 
economic reforms and in individualization of agricultural production were run to 
assess the effects on productivity growth.  In column (2) of Table 2 the results are 
presented of the Solow model augmented with a measure of general economic reforms 
(REFORM). The results of the base regression hold, as the coefficient of the reform 
variable is statistically significant (P < 0.05) and positive as expected. REFORM is a 
synthetic indicator of policy outcomes and reform policies adopted, measuring the 
advancement in general economic reforms. Like in other studies it is interpreted as an 
important condition for successful restructuring of the agricultural sector (Lerman, 
2000; 2001; Macours & Swinnen, 2000a, b), recognizing that the impact of reforms is 
affected by policy choices and initial conditions.14
 Individualization of agricultural production is an important indicator of restructuring 
agriculture. It is the major outcome of the agriculture-specific reform policies adopted. 
The importance of land reform policies lies with the fact that they have resulted in 
different magnitudes of the shift of land to individual farms (INDIVID). So by assessing 
the impact of individualization on (labour) productivity growth we provided an implicit 
evaluation of the success of land reform policies adopted. The results from augmenting 
the Solow model with INDIVID [Table 2, column (3)] show that individualization was 
important for (labour) productivity growth. With respect to both sign and magnitude, 
the regression coefficients for the base variables are as in previous model specifications, 
whereas the coefficient of the individualization variable is positive and statistically 
significant (P < 0.01). This result is important because we found a positive effect of 
individualization, using a dynamic model controlling investment and changes in the 
labour force, which were very important factors of the agricultural sector transformation 
during the period of analysis.
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The results of the impact of agricultural reform (AGREFORM) on productivity growth 
[Table 2, column (4)] are similar to the results in column (2) where the effect of 
general economic reform was estimated. The levels of statistical significance of the 
effects are also similar. It was interesting, however, to assess whether AGREFORM 
had an independent impact on growth or whether it was purely a proxy for success in 
general economic reforms. So we tested for interdependence of effects in the following 
specification where all the measures of reform were included.15
 In Table 2 [column (5)] the results from the Solow model specification augmented 
with both measures of reform (REFORM and AGREFORM) and INDIVID are presented. 
Again the results from the base specification were maintained and the impact of both 
REFORM and INDIVID was positive and statistically significant. It is noteworthy 
that the significance (at conventional levels) of AGREFORM disappeared suggesting 
that individualization of land use was the most important component of agricultural 
reforms. Furthermore, other agricultural reform components reflect the impact of 
general economic reform – a result in line with findings by Rizov (2005b). The rate of 
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Table 2. GMM-IV regression coefficients 1 with standard errors 2 (in parentheses) of augmented Solow 
models of gross agricultural output per worker for 15 former communist countries (n = 102).
Variable Dependent variable (GAOw )
       (1)        (2)        (3)          (4)                (5)
 Base model + REFORM + INDIVID + AGREFORM + (REFORM+INDIVID
     + AGREFORM)
ln (qt–1) –0.0699 ***
 3  –0.0830 *** –0.1180 *** –0.1205 *** –0.1515 ***
 (0.0157)  (0.0162) (0.0182) (0.0208) (0.0274)
ln (s) 0.1159 *** 0.1587 *** 0.1514 *** 0.1520 *** 0.1576 **
 (0.0369) (0.0357) (0.0335) (0.0339) (0.0330)
ln (l+a+d) –0. 6957 *** –0.6793 *** –0.7236 *** –0.7379 ** –0.7774 **
 (0.1339) (0.1244) (0.1201) (0.1215) (0.1256)
ln REFORM – 0.0685 ** – – 0.0660 *
  (0.0319)   (0.0334)
ln INDIVID – – 0.0599 *** – 0.0475 **
   (0.0228)  (0.0220)
ln AGREFORM – – – 0.0620 ** 0.0551 ns
    (0.0306) (0.0383)
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Tests 4
m1  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m2  0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.15
Sargan  0.88 0.96 0.90 0.91 0.90
1 Coefficients represent elasticities.
2 Standard errors are robust to general heteroskedasticity.
3 Statistical significance. ns = not statistically significant; * = P < 0.10; ** = P < 0.05; *** = P < 0.01.
4 P-values of the null hypothesis.
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convergence to steady state (C) more than doubled when both economic reforms and 
restructuring of farms through individualization had been implemented. This result is 
robust to alternative treatments of INDIVID as exogenous or endogenous. 
 Previous studies (Macours & Swinnen, 2000a, b; Falcetti et al., 2002) have 
emphasized the importance of initial conditions in determining performance during 
transition. Their results show that the impact of initial conditions was stronger with 
respect to gross output whereas it was weak with respect to labour productivity. 
In a similar manner a test for the impact of country-specific initial conditions on 
productivity growth was conducted in a second (auxiliary) step of our analysis. 
Keeping in mind the caveats made earlier about possible inconsistency of second-step 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates we analysed relationships by using Spearman 
correlations. For our purpose this approach is sufficient to shed light on a relationship 
where the magnitude of correlation is of main interest, as causality is known a priory.  
 The country-specific characteristics were measured, using two synthetic indices that 
summarize a number of variables describing the inherent institutional and economic 
conditions in the former communist countries at the beginning of transition.16 The 
first index can be interpreted as a measure of inherited distortions and institutional 
constraints. The second initial-conditions index reflects the degree of development 
of the economy. When correlating each index with either actual (labour) productivity 
growth or with the residuals of productivity growth estimates from the specification 
in Table 2 [column (5)] no statistically significant relationships (r < 0.2) were found. 
Correlations were also calculated with the Freedom House measures of democracy and 
governance as discussed earlier, instead of the initial condition indices. However, again 
no statistically significant relationships were found. This may suggest that the main 
impact of initial conditions and institutions that they embody is indirect and channelled 
via the choice of reform policies, as argued earlier.  
Discussion and conclusions 
This paper aimed to explain the heterogeneity in performance of agricultural sectors 
in 15 former communist countries. The analysis specifically focused on (labour) 
productivity growth as a measure of performance and on the importance of reform 
policy choices largely determined by inherent institutions. The main conclusion, i.e., 
that individualization of land use accompanied by a successful general (as opposed to 
agriculture-specific) economic reform positively affects (labour) productivity growth, 
is robust to alternative treatments with respect to endogeneity assumptions. The 
advantage of the approach is that the relationship was analysed within the well-defined 
theoretical framework of the augmented neoclassical growth model. Furthermore, 
when panel data and a GMM-IV first-difference estimator were used, consistent 
regression coefficient estimates were obtained by controlling for endogeneity and 
unobserved country-specific effects.  
 The results of the paper have a number of important policy implications. First, 
it was confirmed that agricultural policy aiming at individualization of agricultural 
land use leads to (labour) productivity growth. Second, reducing excess labour and 
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increasing investment, which are associated with passive and active restructuring, 
respectively, were found to be very important determinants of the (labour) productivity 
growth in former communist countries’ agriculture. Third, general economic reforms 
positively affected (labour) productivity growth whereas differences in initial conditions 
did not have an important (direct) impact during the first ten years of transition. As 
discussed, initial conditions and particularly inherent institutions appeared to have 
significantly affected reform policy choices and outcomes. Furthermore, on the basis 
of our econometric analysis and the discussions throughout this paper, one can 
reasonably argue that success in agricultural transition is strongly correlated with 
advancement in general economic reform, which appeared to be a very important 
condition for (labour) productivity growth in agriculture.
 The general results reported in this paper are in agreement with the findings of 
studies that used more recent and extended samples of aggregate data (e.g., Falcetti et 
al., 2006) or micro-data generated from household and farm surveys (e.g., Swinnen & 
Vranken, 2006; Feng, 2008). Main finding of Falcetti et al. (2006) was the positive and 
significant link between progress in market-oriented reforms and cumulative growth 
in a sample of 27 transition countries, even though their analysis was not specifically 
aimed at agriculture. Falcetti et al. (2006) also confirmed the already established result 
that the importance of initial conditions as a determinant of growth had declined 
over time. Interestingly, factors such as stabilization and oil prices were also found 
to affect growth to some extent but they did not mitigate the importance of reforms, 
which is similar to our findings. In a study specifically aimed at agriculture, Swinnen 
& Vranken (2006) calculated farm-level efficiency indicators for five East European 
countries and linked the indicators to various measures of reforms over the period 
1997–2001. For these five countries they found a positive correlation both between 
the advancement of reforms and productivity in agriculture, and between the share 
of efficient agricultural producers and the stages of reform. Feng (2008) estimated 
the technical efficiency in rice production and examined the effect of land rental 
market participation and off-farm employment on efficiency in rural China during the 
period 2000–2003. Again, the general finding was that technical efficiency improved 
when reforms were implemented that facilitated participation in land renting and 
development of individual farming. 
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Notes 
1 The analysis in this paper covers 15 former communist countries: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine. The reason for including these countries in the sample is twofold. 
First, availability of comparable data limits the set of countries. Second, with respect to agricultural 
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transition most of the former Soviet Union countries can be grouped together, so that using data from 
the four largest countries allows us to form a reliable picture of the agricultural transition in the region 
(Lerman, 2004; Rozelle & Swinnen, 2004). Specifically, similar to Belarus only in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan private ownership of land has not yet been recognized. Physical distribution of farmland 
on an equal per capita basis to farm workers or rural households, similar to the process in Albania, is 
very rare and occurred only in Armenia and Georgia. Most former Soviet Union countries fall into the 
intermediate reformer group that includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia. The group of slow reformers – Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan – is characterized by autocratic regimes with weak or non-existent civil societies, frail 
democratic institutions and highly centralized political power. In this group of countries private property 
rights are very limited. For detailed classification of the countries with respect to progress in agricultural 
transition see Anon. (2002).  
2 Agriculture in Poland and Slovenia was already based on individual farms and private ownership or 
usufruct rights prior to the reform (Swinnen, 1999). 
3 This is the most important method of land reform in the CIS countries. In addition, outsiders who were 
not entitled to land shares could receive land for private farming from a special state reserve established for 
this purpose covering 15 to 20% of total agricultural land (Lerman et al., 2004). 
4 Our approach follows advances in the mainstream growth modelling literature and is an improvement on 
previous agriculture-specific studies. There are several previous aggregate country studies of agricultural 
sector performance that apply pooled or cross-section regressions (Lerman, 2000; 2001; Macours & 
Swinnen, 2000a, b). There are also several studies analysing technical or total factor productivity across 
farm types but only in a few transition countries and using only partially representative data (e.g., Mathijs 
& Swinnen, 2001); Gorton & Davidova (2004) offer a review of such studies.
5 The analysis is inspired, in part, by the recent literature on varieties of capitalism (VoC) represented 
by Hall & Soskice (2001) amongst others. Institutional complementarity is a key concept of the VoC 
perspective. Specifically, for the case of agricultural transition and accession to the EU, Slangen et al. 
(2004), following ideas in the spirit of VoC, point to the need of complementarity between protection 
of private property, freedom of exchange, trust, consistency in monitoring environmental laws, and 
governments that act neutrally and are not corrupt, in order the transition process to succeed. 
6 Bezlepkina et al. (2005) studied the effect of subsidies on the dairy producers in the Moscow region 
and found a low responsiveness to market signals. They also found that subsidies have a distorting effect 
on the input–output mix. At the same time the study shows that subsidies relieve the credit constraints 
on dairy farms and have an important positive influence on short-term farm profit.
7 Freedom House (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1>) was founded in 1941 by 
Eleanor Roosevelt and other prominent individuals concerned with the mounting threats to peace and 
democracy. Freedom House is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that through a vast array of 
international programmes and publications is working to advance the worldwide expansion of political 
and economic freedom. 
8 Performing similar analyses of correlations between the reform indicators and two synthetic indices 
of initial conditions, one measuring inherent distortions and institutional constraints and the other the 
degree of development of the economy (see further), also confirms the positive relationship between 
success in reforms and good inherent institutions.
9 Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) augment the Solow model with investment in 
human capital as an additional determinant of growth in output per worker. Note that the variables that 
we use measure the progress in reforms and reflect the impact of changes due to reform policies. 
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10 See Chapter 2 of the EBRD Transition Report (Anon., 2002) for detailed definitions of these indicators.
11 Arellano & Bond (1991) suggest a first difference GMM-IV estimator and Blundell & Bond (1998) 
improve the performance of the estimator by extending the instrument set used. An alternative approach 
to estimate productivity (at firm level) suggested by Olley & Pakes (1996) deals with both simultaneity 
and selection biases due to the presence of unobservable heterogeneity across firms. However, the 
GMM-IV estimator is more appropriate in cases where the impacts of several endogenous variables are 
estimated and selection does not play an important role.
12 In order to evaluate the impact of country-specific observed characteristics on GAOw that are 
eliminated from the first-difference equation a second step estimation can be added up, similarly 
to Blanchflower et al. (1996) and Battese & Coelli (1995). The consistent GMM estimates from the 
first-difference equation are used to calculate the residuals of Equation (3). In the second step these 
residuals are regressed on the measured country-specific characteristics, wi. The ordinary least squares 
levels estimation of the second-stage equation generates a consistent coefficient estimate if all wi
characteristics are uncorrelated with νi, which is a strong assumption and we treat such estimates 
with caution. The estimation results, which show no statistically significant impact of wi on (labour) 
productivity growth, can be obtained from the author upon request.
13 Results reported are under the assumption that all right-hand-site variables are predetermined. 
Versions of the regressions where investment and growth in labour force are assumed endogenous were 
also run but the results were not statistically different. The results from these alternative treatments are 
available upon request.  
14 In a second (auxiliary) step of the analysis direct correlations between initial conditions and 
productivity were further explored. However no statistically significant relationships were found.
15 In a base specification augmented only with REFORM and AGREFORM variables we found that the 
statistical significance (at conventional levels, P < 0.10) of AGREFORM disappears. A similar result 
with respect to the significance of AGREFORM is also observed in a specification augmented with 
AGREFORM and INDIVID. The regression results are available upon request.  
16 The indices are based on a principal component analysis. See the Technical Note to Chapter 4 of the 
EBRD Transition Report (Anon., 2002) for more details.
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